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Studies of state formation tend to emphasize the demise of localism through centralization. 
This article specifies empirically the social structural conditions that strengthen localism 
under state formation. The historical case is the creation of Vermont during the 
Revolutionary War and the local factionalism it involved. Probate records are used to 
reconstruct credit networks that provided the relational foundation for localism and factional 
identities. The evidence demonstrates that network segregation between factional regions 
intensified over time, and was supported by strong cohesion within these regions. Local 
brokers who forged cohesion within factions consistently attained important political offices 
while mediators between opposing factions increasingly failed to obtain offices. This 
structural process coincided with the shift of Vermont's domestic politics into national level 
conflicts between Federalists and Jeffersonians. Within this escalation local and national 
factions crystallized around equivalent pairs of binary categorical oppositions. The evocation 
of national politics directly resonated with local lines of conflict, and reinforced factional 
identities and localism. 
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Factional Politics and Credit Networks in Revolutionary Vermont 
 
 
“Instant credit in the straight world / Leaving money when you die 
Lots of credit in the real world / gets you high” 
–-Young Marble Giants 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies of state building in various places and times have repeatedly argued that centralization is the 
essence of state making. Centralization in turn is directed against localism, and it is the eventual 
demise of localism that concludes successful state formation. Alexis de Tocqueville furnished the 
master story for this perspective. As he observed in France, "until almost the end of the seventeenth 
century some towns were still to all intents and purposes small democratic republics, their officials 
being elected by the townsfolk and answerable to them alone. In short, there was an active municipal 
life in which all took part" (1983: 41). This state of affairs changed radically with centralization under 
the absolutist régime as "the government took a hand in all local affairs, even the most trivial. 
Nothing could be done without consulting the central authority, which had decided views on 
everything. […] Under the old régime, as nowadays, there was in France no township, borough, 
village, or hamlet, however small, no hospital factory, convent, or college which had a right to 
manage its own affairs as it thought fit or to administer its possessions without interference. Then, as 
today, the central power held all Frenchmen in tutelage" (1983: 46, 51). 
 In this article, I specify empirically the social structural conditions that strengthen localism 
under state formation. The historical example is the creation of Vermont during the Revolutionary 
War. I show how local identities that gave rise to factional politics within Vermont were grounded in 
concrete social networks that were seemingly unrelated to political interests. Studies of modern state 
building tend to focus on the vertical relation between national state builders and defenders of 
localism. Instead, I focus on the horizontal ties between rival political factions at the local level and 
their subsequent embedding into national level politics (Barth 1965; Leach 1964). In particular, I 
reconstruct credit networks among eighteenth century Vermonters from archival probate records. 
The prevalent use of credit notes and book accounts, due to an insufficient money supply, gave rise 
to an emergent credit network. Thus, the reasons for the existence of this credit network and the 
incentives driving credit exchange were exogenous to the political conflicts within Vermont. The 
evidence from these data demonstrates that state making in Vermont was a localist enterprise that 
rested on shifting alliances among political factions attached to their regional bases. Increasing 
segregation between competing localist factions coincided with the shift of Vermont politics into 
conflicts at the national level. 
 The creation of Vermont was the outcome of a dual rebellion against both New York and 
Great Britain. In 1777, representatives of separatist Vermont towns drafted their own constitution 
and declared their independence from New York (Onuf 1983; Williamson 1949). Despite active 
participation of most Vermonters in the revolutionary war against Britain, New York and the 
Continental Congress refused to recognize Vermont’s existence until 1791, when it became the 
fourteenth state of the Union. Even within the new state, the claim to independence and the 
authority of the state's founders were contested between fiercely opposed political factions. In the 
absence of a collective identity, Vermonters reverted to their localist identities. Unlike the original 
thirteen states, revolutionary Vermont lacked a political community. Instead of relying on a colonial 
past, Vermont's separatists had to invent one. In the nascent American nation, Vermont thus became 
the yardstick for the establishment of new states along the western and northern frontier that 
followed its lead. 
 This study draws on and extends the growing body of research on the social relational 
foundations of identity in historical contexts (Bearman 1993; Calhoun 1982; Gould 1995, 1996; 
Padgett and Ansell 1993). The important insight of these studies is that meaning stems from the 
patterns of social structures that actors are embedded in. In this view, collective identities arise when 
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actors realize that they share similar positions in relation to others in concrete social networks. 
Abstract categorical differences such as Religion or Ethnicity are the signals actors employ to give 
meaning to their shared location in social structure rather than the foundation of their collective 
identities. Here, I focus on networks of credit exchanges as the structural basis for localist identities 
that were articulated in terms of political, religious and regional factions. 
 The central finding of this study is that localism was strengthened precisely at the time when 
Vermont's political conflicts were shifted into the higher level of national politics and cast in terms of 
Hamiltonian Federalism versus Jeffersonian Republicanism. Thus, the emergence of the United 
States as a nation did not erode localist identities within Vermont but rather strengthened them. 
Indeed, as historian Peter Onuf observed, "nowhere in America did local communities become so 
thoroughly accustomed to such a high degree of political self-determination" (1983:142). 
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section offers a brief account 
of the historical context and extant historical interpretations. In the third part, I discuss existing 
approaches to factionalism and state building to derive the theoretical model for the empirical 
analysis. The fourth section describes the sources and structure of the data utilized and the 
measurement of variables. The fifth part examines correlates of early factional alignment. In the sixth 
section, I focus on shifting patterns in the structure of credit exchanges over time. This is followed 
by the identification of individual positions of brokerage in the credit network and their link to 
changing patterns of office holding over time. The central finding of increasing localism over time is 
then related to the rise of national politics in Vermont. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The thirteen original American states claimed their authority and legitimacy on the basis of three 
principles: the natural right of a sovereign people to self-government; territorial integrity as successor 
states to the British colonies; and mutual recognition among all thirteen states (Onuf 1983; Slaughter 
1986). Vermont’s early leaders rested their claim on the natural right principle, but they failed to 
secure the recognition of the other American states until 1791 when Vermont was finally accepted 
into the Union as the fourteenth state. The founders of the new state also failed to invoke a political 
identity as Vermonters among its own populace. In the absence of legitimate authority and a unified 
political community, deep cleavages between local factions prevailed. 
 Vermont's factional conflicts were rooted partly in a land controversy. Titles to lands west of 
the Green Mountains that New Hampshire’s governor had sold to New England settlers often 
overlapped with titles held by New York proprietors. Inevitably, conflicts between supporters of 
New York authority and those who favored New Hampshire ensued. When New York proprietors 
and authorities sought eviction by force confrontations escalated towards collective violence. The 
Grants settlers banded together as the so-called Green Mountain Boys in an armed insurgency 
against New York. By 1777, Vermont’s western leaders, including the state's first governor Thomas 
Chittenden and the brothers Ira and Ethan Allen, also known in New York as the "Bennington 
Mob" or the "Arlington Junto", had gathered enough support throughout the Grants. At the second 
convention of town representatives in Westminster, they declared Vermont's independence from 
both revolutionary New York and Great Britain (Bellesiles 1993; Jellison 1969; Jones 1939; 
O’Callaghan 1851, vol. IV; Williamson 1949). 
 Support for the independence movement and the Chittenden-Allen faction was greatest in 
the western half of the new state. Many settlers in this region shared the interests of the Chittenden-
Allen government in securing their New Hampshire land titles and engaging in trade with British 
Canada (Jones 1939; Taylor 1995; Williamson 1949). In the eastern Connecticut Valley, however, 
supporters of New York continued to oppose Vermont, and especially the Chittenden-Allen faction 
in open rebellion well into the 1780s. Yorkers who had their stronghold in southeastern Cumberland 
County (Windham County under Vermont) were encouraged in their opposition by the state of New 
York whose government continued to appoint public and military offices in the county. Southeastern 
Yorkers clashed in increasingly violent confrontations with the state militia of Vermont until their 
military resistance was quelled by 1784. Although most Yorkers supported the Revolution, western 
leaders tried to equate opposition to Vermont with loyalism to the British (Bellesiles 1993; Walton 
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1875, vol. III: 302-14). Loyalty in the northeastern Coos Country around the town of Newbury, 
which bordered on New Hampshire, was wavering as well. Their political leader, the conservative 
revolutionary Jacob Bayley, favored alignment with New Hampshire or New York should these 
states respond to the wish for more representation of the northeastern backcountry. Above all, 
Bayley resented the political dominance of the western Chittenden-Allen and Bennington factions in 
the new state of Vermont, and only grudgingly supported independence when New York failed to 
respond to northeastern demands (Williamson 1949). 
  These political conflicts were tightly coupled with religious cleavages that had erupted during 
the Great Awakening in southern New England. Revival movements were diffused by migrants to 
the northern frontier and turned Vermont into one of the regions "burned-over" by religious fervor. 
The western counties, dominated by supporters of independent Vermont, adhered largely to radical 
Calvinist sects such as the New Lights and Separates. Especially in the southeastern towns, by 
contrast, strong opposition to Vermont and loyalty to New York prevailed among their mainly Old 
Light and Anglican populations (Roth 1987; Shalhope 1994; Smith 1981, 1996).1 
 In the late 1780s and after Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791, another factional 
divide along very similar lines emerged when Vermont's internal disputes became increasingly shaped 
by political controversies at the national level. Here, Nathaniel Chipman and Isaac Tichenor 
succeeded in uniting eastern Yorker elites and conservative western elites in a coalition that 
temporally ousted the Chittenden-Allen faction from government. The coalition of Yorker Old Light 
gentlemen and western merchant and lawyer elites supported the Federalist Party. Chittenden, the 
Allens and their mainly New Light yeomen followers sided with the Jeffersonian Republican Party 
(Austin 1974; Chipman 1846; Shalhope 1996; Williamson 1949). 
 Likewise, the geophysical environment of Vermont provided an ideal setting in support of 
factional strife and strong localism. First, as in other parts of New England, rural settlements were 
organized as nucleated village communities that were widely dispersed with few communication 
channels linking them (Lemon 1984). Second, the Green Mountain range physically separated eastern 
pro-Yorker and western pro-Vermont townships and determined their political and economic 
geography. The southwestern region around Bennington was commercially tied to the Hudson and 
New York, while inhabitants of the Champlain Valley saw their opportunities in Quebec, and the 
eastern Connecticut Valley focused on New England markets (Williamson 1949). The internal 
political conflicts spilled over to neighboring areas in other states during Vermont’s temporary 
annexation of fifty-one New Hampshire towns in the two Eastern Unions (1778 and 1781) and 
twelve New York towns in the Western Union (1781). These expansions were quickly dissolved after 
credible threats by the Continental Congress, but they led western Vermont towns to fear dominance 
of eastern Vermont towns and vice versa (Onuf 1983; Williamson 1949). 
 Early Vermont’s frontier society shared the political and economic tensions of other 
backcountry regions—namely conflicts between frontier settlers and seaboard merchants and 
gentlemen over land titles, quit rents, taxes, cash shortage and indebtedness, and inadequate 
representation in state assemblies (Nobles 1989; Slaughter 1986; Szatmary 1980; Taylor 1995; Turner 
1996). Not all such backcountry grievances gave rise to independence movements, whether backed 
by armed insurgencies or not. Yet, the imminent separation of Kentucky from Virginia, Franklin 
(Tennessee) from North Carolina and Maine from Massachusetts was reason enough for members of 
Congress to be concerned that “a separation of any district from a State having a right to exercise 
constitutional jurisdiction over such district, unless by the consent of the State and of the United 
States, would be a violation of and have a tendency to subvert the fundamental principles of the 
Union” (Walton 1875, III: 338). The significance of Vermont is that it was the first truly new (and 
thus perhaps the most decisive) state of the nascent American nation. Like the other new frontier 
                                                     
1 The main difference between the two religious affiliations concerned whether salvation is attained through 
free will and good works as claimed by Arminians (Old Light, Old Side, Anglican, Freewill Baptist, Quaker), or 
whether it is predetermined and depends on God's grace as Calvinists (New Light, New Side, Separate, 
Separate Baptist) believed (Smith 1996: 227; Roth 1987: 26-40). 
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states that were to follow it, the state of Vermont lacked a past and its founders had to build its 
political community (Onuf 1983). 
LOCALISM, FACTIONALISM AND THE STATE 
Most approaches to state building in the social science literature tend to analyze localism and political 
centralization as a vertical relationship of successive submission of communal autonomy to national 
authority. Once more, Tocqueville may serve to illustrate this perspective. Tocqueville (1994: 507-17) 
argued that state building in "democratic ages" broke the chains of hierarchical positioning and  
mutual obligations that reached from rural communities through the seigneurie to the court, and 
provided the social cement of aristocratic societies. The destruction of these bonds among 
individuals isolated them from each other and endangered liberty. This is the condition that breeds 
despotism and ultimately totalitarianism (Arendt 1973). In France, Tocqueville argued, the autonomy 
of local communes and the mediating role of landed aristocrats were undermined through the 
centralization of the state administration, a process which had begun under the Ancien Régime and 
was continued by the revolutionaries: "Of all forms of liberty, that of a local community, which is so 
hard to establish, is the most prone to the encroachments of authority. Left to themselves, the 
institutions of a local community can hardly struggle against a strong and enterprising government" 
(Tocqueville 1994: 62). 
 The Tocquevillian perspective on state making (Skocpol 1985) has been adopted (to 
different degrees) and refined by others (e.g. Blickle 1997; Root 1987; Tilly 1975, 1976, 1990).2 The 
basic argument of their studies is the following. Through enlistment of powerful elites and the 
creation of centralized institutions, state-builders are seen to enforce their monopoly of legitimate 
violence and extract the resources necessary for further consolidation of state power. Popular 
resistance typically arises when coercive state centralization, often in alliance with emergent capitalist 
interests, threatens the traditional fabric and moral economy of local communities (Blickle 1997; 
Luebke 1997). For my purpose here, the relevant conclusion of these otherwise diverse studies is that 
state formation eventually eclipsed localism (Tilly 1975: 21-25; Bearman 1993). 
 The historical events surrounding the emergence of Vermont as a state are significantly at 
odds with this perspective. In most general terms, revolutionary state making in Vermont (and 
perhaps in all other American states) consisted of two phases that operated at different levels of 
organization. The first phase concerned the separation from New York and the effort to integrate 
localist factions into a new political entity called the state of Vermont. The second phase concerned 
the integration of Vermont into the Union of American states. I argue that this two-stage process 
points to the need to distinguish between vertical and horizontal modes of political organization 
(Lachmann 1989). The attempt of Vermont's founders to construct a cohesive political community, 
on which statehood claims could be rested, operated at a horizontal level between localist factions. 
The second phase of integration into the Union consisted of a vertical shift of local politics into the 
debates between Federalists and Republicans at the national level. The historical irony of this 
escalating process (Schwartz 1976), as I show in some detail below, was that both frames of identity 
− at the local and the national level − allowed factional alignments to crystallize around equivalent 
pairs of binary categorical oppositions (e.g. hierarchical order vs. popular democracy, tradition vs. 
progression, or "the common yeomen" vs. "the new aristocrats"). These binary oppositions in turn 
were grounded in tangible networks of social relations. This coupling of local and national level 
identities within concrete social structures did not destroy, but rather supported localism. In the 
remainder of this section, I shall describe the properties of localism that are significant to my 
argument, and sketch the structural challenges that factional politics based on localism poses to 
horizontal state integration. 
 The historical evidence described above suggests that localism in early Vermont can be 
defined as categorical homogeneity, primarily with respect to religious affiliations, political 
worldviews, and migration origins. In addition, the sectional geography of the state allowed 
                                                     
2 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that all research on state formation flows from a single source. I simplify 
subtleties to emphasize a general argument about the demise of localism through state making. 
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settlement patterns to further consolidate these categorical differences (Smith 1981; 1996). Thus, in 
Vermont, localism could be organized along the natural divisions provided by ecological 
homogeneity (Bearman 1993: 43; Leach 1964). As I shall demonstrate in more detail below, this 
condition also meant that factional cleavages found a natural foundation along the same lines. In 
other words, factional cleavages were by and large congruent with the localist identities that were 
attached to regional divisions and articulated through categorical markers such as religious and 
political alignments. 
 Social networks provided the relational foundation for localism and factional identities 
(Gould 1995). In this article, I examine the role of networks of credit exchanges as the basis for 
collective identities. The focus on networks leads to the central structural problem within horizontal 
state building processes. In early Vermont, the concrete issue at the horizontal level was to what 
extent structurally based segregation between localized factions could be bridged through cross-
factional ties in order to achieve integration and a political community as Vermonters.3 In this 
respect, revolutionary Vermont’s frontier society is one historical example of a general phenomenon. 
The sociological significance of frontiers is their lack of sufficient building blocks for social structures 
that can work to integrate local groups across their categorical divisions. In the absence of adequate 
sources for macro-level integration, segregation and factional dispute tend to dictate the few 
remaining inter-group relations. Comparable are societies during civil war and its aftermath, where 
factionalism often prevails even if one party wins over the other, and cleavages among the population 
continue to be driven by ethnic or religious distinctions. 
 More abstractly, the structural dilemma is that strong cohesion at lower levels of social 
organization tends to constrain cohesion at higher levels. George Homans recognized this tension 
long ago when he remarked that the “measure of the cohesion of community is its distrust of 
outsiders” (Homans 1941: 328). Cohesive subgroups or clusters in a network are characterized by a 
high density of ties among members within the group. Research on social networks also shows that 
the total number of ties individuals send or receive tends to be limited. It follows that the number of 
ties sent within one's subgroup will necessarily reduce the number of contacts outside one's 
subgroup. This process thus reduces the global cohesion of the network that comprises all 
subgroups. Conversely, if the number of contacts between members of different subgroups increases 
it will decrease the number of ties sent within each subgroup, and hence decrease its internal 
cohesion. In the empirical analysis of this article, I use the proportion of within-group and between-
group relationships as a global network measure to assess the extent of cohesion and segregation 
among localist factions. 
 Two distinct structural positions of individuals correspond to these global tendencies. Both 
positions create structural opportunities to assemble relationships and to mediate between other 
individuals. In the literature, such positions are described as brokers. Yet, again the emphasis tends to 
be on the vertical orientation of brokers as interlocutors who adjudicate between local communities 
and state officials, operating at the national level. Local elites who are placed in advantageous 
positions in communal social structures are thus co-opted into the process of centralization through 
political patronage. Due to their mediating position between local and national society, these elites 
are ideally situated to play the role of political brokers (Blok 1974; Gould 1996, 1998; Kettering 1988; 
Tilly 1976). Here, I contend that positions of brokerage need not be limited to vertical relationships 
between local and national society. Instead, I focus on two types of brokerage that again operate 
along horizontal divisions. The first type comprises local leaders who act as brokers to coordinate 
                                                     
3 Social integration is certainly not a necessary condition for state making to succeed. In fact, totalitarian 
regimes actively dissociate members of society to secure their position (Arendt 1973). As an example from a 
different context, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouges aimed to erase previous identities of Cambodians: “Overnight they 
became ‘new people’, or ‘April 17 people’ − less than human, without privileges or rights.” (Chandler 1993: 
103). I argue that horizontal state building that rests on radical democratic principles, as in Vermont, is in 
principle inclusive and at least seeks to integrate civil society rather than to isolate its members. To provide only 
one example, Vermont's constitution of 1777 was one of the first to grant universal manhood suffrage, whereas 
other states still required qualifications for suffrage (Williamson: 64-65). 
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relationships within factional groups and to strengthen localism. Their aim is to create local "islands 
of authority", bundles of social relationships that forge political solidarity within localist factions 
(Barth 1965: 69). The second type entails individuals whose position in social structure allows them 
to act as mediators in horizontal conflicts between factions. Unlike the first type, these inter-group 
brokers seek to build bridges across the structural holes and categorical cleavages between opposing 
factions, and thus increase integration and help to mitigate social conflict (Barth 1965: 96-99; Padgett 
and Ansell 1993). In the next section, I shall discuss in detail the sources for the empirical analysis of 
these concepts in the context of revolutionary Vermont. 
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT 
This article exploits a well-known data source of early American history, probate records, in an 
innovative way. I build credit exchange networks from extensive lists of debtors and creditors 
contained in these archival records. Historians appreciate and rely on the richness of this source, yet 
they tend to treat credit networks as attributes of individuals. Typically, the total or average number 
of debt and credit relations per person is presented, sometimes over successive periods. From a 
sociological viewpoint, such an approach misses the opportunity to use probate data as a rich source 
for analyzing tangible social structure. Unlike most historical studies, I employ formal network 
analysis techniques to identify patterns and positions in credit networks that are systematically linked 
to the political process of state-building in Vermont. 
 A large literature documents that credit relationships were rivaled only by kinship ties in their 
salience for early American society (Horwitz 1977: 212-26; Lemon 1984; Mathias 2000; Rothenberg 
1985).4 The primary reason for the widespread reliance on credit notes and book accounts was “to 
overcome the lack of specie”, especially after the Revolutionary War cut off trade relations with 
English merchants (Sheridan 1984:73; Horwitz 1977: 215). Across different regions, backcountry 
farmers, local shopkeepers, and eastern merchants were intricately linked through this “credit nexus” 
(Lemon 1984: 110). In the Chesapeake, for instance, the planter gentry used credit to bind 
neighboring yeomen into patronage networks to secure their support for representatives of elite 
families in local politics (Kulikoff 1986: 280-90; Burnard 1995). Similarly, the local economy on the 
early Connecticut frontier consisted of a dense web of credit ties wherein the average settler owed to 
at least twenty local creditors (Grant 1961: 66-82). In Vermont, “the more exact and rationalized 
structure of a cash economy did not appear until half a century after the first settlements in the 
Green Mountains and did not monopolize exchange until the Civil War” (Bellesiles 1993: 59). The 
total amount of credit and debt often accounted for the second largest share of the total probated 
property behind real estate (Bellesiles 1993). As well, political tensions arising out of debtor 
grievances stirred not only Shays’ rebellion in Massachusetts (Szatmary 1980) but also numerous riots 
against courts and creditors within Vermont during 1783-1786 (Walton 1875, vol. III: 357-380; 
Williamson 1949: 168-69). 
The best available source for data on credit relationships are probate records. Estates of 
deceased persons were probated if the latter left a will, owned real estate at the time of death, left 
minor heirs, had outstanding credits due to them, or if they died indebted. An important function of 
the probate process was to secure the claims of creditors and the rightful share of the heirs before 
any property could be dispersed by others (Izard 1997; Jones 1977; Main 1985). Most Vermont 
probate records list creditors and debtors of the deceased, in addition to wills and inventories of 
property. Estates were appraised by commissioners, usually within six months from the date of 
death. All commissioners, typically next of kin or neighbors of equal social standing as the deceased, 
                                                     
4 I focus on credit networks rather than kinship ties because the latter are unlikely to offer more than a 
replication of known categorical differences such as religion, migration history and settlement patterns. Smith 
(1996) shows that pro-Vermonters and pro-New Yorkers followed significantly different migration paths from 
southern New England into southwestern and southeastern Vermont, respectively. Likewise, migrants moved 
as bi- and tri-generational families, and thereby kept families together within regions. Cohesive family structures 
also suggest that marriages across different religious denominations were rare at best − after all, religious 
distinction was sufficiently important to many settlers to relocate to the northern frontier. 
 6
were appointed by the judge of probate, proceeded under oath, and had to pay a substantial bond of 
surety.5 
 This study is based on credit network data collected from eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century probate records housed in the archives of Vermont probate courts. All data were 
collected from the southern Bennington and Windham counties because these two counties were the 
political and economic centers of revolutionary Vermont, and dominated the new state 
demographically in the period of interest to this study (Shalhope 1996; Williamson 1949).6 A detailed 
prosopography by Smith (1981; 1996), listing 1,343 residents in western and eastern Vermont who 
were actively involved in the religious and political conflicts of early Vermont provided the sampling 
frame for a stratified random sample of 88 individuals from the probate archives. Probated 
individuals and their ego networks of creditors and debtors were the sampling units. The sample was 
stratified by residence (counties to the west or east of the Green Mountains) so that random samples 
of probated individuals were taken independently in the western and eastern probate districts.7 
The years of the selected probate files range from 1778 to 1818, but most of them (72 
records) are dated before 1805. Each record contains the names of debtors and creditors to the 
estate, the amount of money involved, the type of credit (mostly notes of hand or book accounts), 
the date of the report, and the names of the commissioners. Some lists also include the residence of 
debtors and creditors, interest accrued and the date of credit exchanges.8 The 88 selected lists of debt 
and credit relationships were then coded into a single ego-centered credit network among 3,678 
individuals linked through 4,860 relationships with directed ties pointing from debtors to creditors. 
The average number of network ties per individual is 2.64 (min.=1 and max.=1093). 
There is no evidence that the results reported here suffer significantly from the systematic 
selection biases commonly associated with probate data (Elliott 1985; Izard 1997; Jones 1977; Lindert 
1981; Main 1975, 1985; Smith 1975). First, the tendency of probate records to exclude women and 
non-whites does not concern the present analysis. Probate records virtually do not exist for women 
in Vermont during the period of interest, but the focus of this article is on the link between credit 
networks and political action, and women were not allowed to vote or to occupy political offices, nor 
are women documented to have participated in political action. Likewise, a potential race bias is not 
directly relevant. American Indians were largely driven out of Vermont and played no decisive role in 
the politics of the state (Calloway 1984). Vermont’s constitution was the first to ban slavery, and the 
population of blacks in the state was negligible at the time. The 1790 census lists merely sixteen “free 
colored” who were mistakenly classified as slaves (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1908: 8). The network 
data contain three individuals with the surname “Negro”, but none of them held political offices at 
any time or were directly involved in other forms of political action. Second, probate fees were 
usually not as high to provide an incentive to give up any inherited property, to transfer large 
amounts of wealth prior to death, or to evade the process entirely (Jones 1977). Finally, the probated 
dead tended to be older and therefore wealthier than the average living individual. Since I do not seek 
to explain variation in the wealth distribution this potential bias affects the present analysis only 
marginally. 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                     
5 For precise regulations of the entire probate process, see Soule (1964: 100-108) and Williams (1966: 202-212). 
6 Estimates for 1762 show that settlement in the Vermont area was limited to about 70 families in the 
Southeast, and about 50 families in the Southwest around Bennington. In 1772, southeastern Cumberland Co. 
had 3,947, northeastern Gloucester Co. 722, and western Charlotte Co. 2,645 inhabitants. The overall 
population increased significantly from about 20,000 in 1776 to 85,425 in 1790, and again to 154,396 in 1800. 
Bennington, the southwestern center, had 2,350 inhabitants in 1790, and was the second largest town behind 
the Yorker stronghold Guilford in the Southeast, which counted 2,422 inhabitants (see Bellesiles 1993: 280-83; 
Mark 1940: 167; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1908, 1938; Williamson 1949: 14). 
7 Sample weights were used in statistical analyses to correct for disproportionate numbers of estates selected 
from the western probate districts. 
8 Appendix A provides details on the distribution of values of credit ties and inferences for missing dates. 
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Table 1 describes the variables created from the probate records and additional data, and lists their 
sources. Four network variables were coded from the structure of credit exchanges. The first two 
variables concern the overall volume of credit activity per person. Indegree is the total number of ties 
received, or equivalently the number of debtors a person had. Outdegree is the total number of ties 
sent, or the number of creditors a person borrowed from. Indegree and outdegree are count 
variables. The other two network variables, coordination and brokerage, measure structural positions 
of mediation that individuals can occupy between and within subgroups.9 I discuss the basis for the 
subgroup partition of the present network in some detail in the next section. Here, it will suffice to 
describe the general properties of the two variables. A coordinator position is occupied by actors 
who mediate between members of their own subgroup who do not share a direct tie with each other. 
Coordination measures intra-group mediation. Coordinators forge the cohesion of local subgroups. 
In contrast to coordination, brokerage denotes positions occupied by actors who mediate between 
members of different subgroups who do not share a direct relationship with each other. Brokerage 
measures inter-group mediation. Brokers build bridges across factional cleavages that divide 
subgroups.10 
 The credit network data were complemented with micro-data from various published 
sources. Information on residence was taken from the 1790 and 1800 Vermont census (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1908, 1938) and additional sources (Comstock 1918; Fisher and Fisher 1992). 
Adherence to early pro-Vermont and pro-New York factions was obtained from Fisher and Fisher 
(1992) and Smith (1981; 1996), and was measured by rioting in favor of either cause, affidavits, public 
statements, membership in the Green Mountain Boys militia for pro-Vermonters, and for pro-
Yorkers, holding New York offices in Vermont after the latter’s declaration of independence, or 
receiving compensation from New York for resistance to Vermont. Later factional adherence was 
coded from various sources including Austin (1974), Shalhope (1994), Smith (1981) and Williamson 
(1949), and measured as support for the Federalist Party or the Jeffersonian Republican Party. 
Religion was coded as affiliation with Calvinist or Arminian persuasion (from Smith 1981; 1996. See 
note 2 above for details). Data on political and military office holding under Vermont and New York 
includes the number, dates and administrative level of offices held (from Comstock 1918; Fisher and 
Fisher 1992; Smith 1981. See appendix B for detailed coding of offices). 
RESULTS 
Early Factions: Vermonters versus Yorkers  
                                                     
The first phase in the history of revolutionary Vermont lasted roughly from the 1760s when the first 
land riots of New England settlers against New York began until the Treaty of Paris in 1783 which 
ended the Revolutionary War. This period was characterized by the (often violent) conflicts between 
supporters of Vermont's independence − namely the Bennington and Arlington Junto around 
Governor Chittenden and the Allens − and those living in southeastern Cumberland/Windham 
County (New York/Vermont) who remained in stern support of New York's authority on the 
Grants. Historians have sought to identify the sources of this factional conflict in early Vermont in a 
range of categorical differences (see Graffagnino 1978). These differences comprise colliding 
economic interests of Yankee and Yorker land speculators (Jones 1939; Graffagnino 1991; Taylor 
1995; Williamson 1949), the lack of local order and reliable law enforcement on the frontier 
(Bellesiles 1993), contrasting political (e.g. extent of local self-determination) and administrative 
9 Note that the opportunity for mediation, like other network properties, is not an attribute of individuals, but 
rather resides in the specific position an individual occupies within a social structure (Mayhew 1980). 
10 The coordinator and broker variables are based on the measures developed by Gould and Fernandez (1989). 
They distinguish between one position of within-group coordination and four subtypes of inter-group 
mediation according to the number of distinct subgroups involved and the position of the mediator. Here, I 
collapse the four inter-group subtypes into a single brokerage category. One reason is that there are not enough 
cases within each subtype. More important, and as the analyses below will show, my concern here are 
essentially binary oppositions between factions that are transposed across different contexts. Essential for my 
purpose here is that Gould and Fernandez distinguish clearly between intra- and inter-group mediation 
(compared to other intuitive measures of brokerage like betweenness centrality). 
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traditions (freehold versus leasehold land use) between Yankees and Yorkers (Jellison 1969; Fox 
1940; Mark 1940), and disputes spawned by religious zeal (Shalhope 1996; Roth 1987; Smith 1981, 
1996; Williamson 1949). 
 In this section, I assess the role of religion, region, office holding under New York and later 
under Vermont, and credit network activity as correlates of early faction membership in support of 
Vermont independence or New York.11 Data on these dimensions and early faction membership are 
available for 283 individuals within the credit network data set that was constructed from the probate 
records. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of attributes by political faction. The number of 
cases and the proportion (in parentheses) within each faction are reported for categorical variables. 
Chi-square tests are used to test significant differences between the two political factions. For 
continuous variables of credit network indegree and outdegree, weighted sample means and 
corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Means on these variables for the two 
groups are compared using t-test statistics. 
[Table 2 about here] 
A clear pattern of correlations emerges from these results. The bivariate relationships of religious 
affiliation and residence with faction membership provide strong support for the historical account 
that political and religious disputes were closely associated with each other and consolidated by 
residential choice. On the one hand, the share of radical Calvinists (New Lights and Separates) 
among pro-Vermonters was disproportionately higher (66%) than among pro-Yorkers (merely 1%). 
The proportion of Arminians (Old Lights and Anglicans), on the other hand, was significantly greater 
among pro-Yorkers (78%) compared to the pro-Vermont faction (11%). 
 Likewise, there is strong evidence for residential segregation between the two political 
factions. Supporters of independent Vermont were concentrated in the Southwest and to a lesser 
degree in the Northwest. Taken together, both regions accounted for 78% of the settlers in favor of 
Vermont independence from New York. Residents in southeastern Windham County, by contrast, 
accounted for 81% of New York supporters, while only 7% of Yorkers resided in the western 
counties. There are no further significant differences between the two parties with respect to the 
remaining regions. 
 In addition, I find no statistically significant differences between pro-Vermonters and pro-
Yorkers in the distribution of office holding under Vermont authority (I shall have more to say about 
shifts in office holding patterns below). The proportion of officers under New York authority was 
significantly greater for pro-Yorkers than for pro-Vermonters. This result is not surprising since the 
acceptance of a public or military office offered by the government of New York within the territory 
of Vermont after Vermont's declaration of independence clearly indicated a political preference for 
New York over Vermont. 
 In order to further explore the coupling of credit exchange networks and factional identities, 
the network population needs to be partitioned into mutually exclusive subsets. While it seems 
natural to use a binary partition according to early faction membership (pro-Vermont vs. pro-New 
York), the number of cases for which such information is available (N=283) is too low to be 
meaningfully mapped onto a network of 3,678 individual nodes.12 I therefore use residence as the 
best available proxy for political allegiance and as the criterion for the network partition. This 
decision is justified on the grounds of the strong association between residence and political 
                                                     
11 The exclusion of conflicting land titles in the present analysis is partly due to data limitations, but also 
because the numerous applications of holders of New Hampshire land titles for confirmation by the 
government of New York blurs the strict distinction between titles. As well, Smith (1981: 163-168; 1996: 228) 
found no statistically significant relation between land titles and economic interest. Here, the extent of 
involvement in the credit network covers economic activity. The different traditions of land use (leasehold vs. 
freehold) are excluded for the same reasons as land titles. 
12 An alternative strategy is to start with a structurally induced partition of the network, and then test for 
differences in the distribution of categorical attributes of individuals across these structural subsets. I applied a 
number of standard network analysis routines for detecting structural subgroups (e.g. k-components, k-cores, 
cliques and p-cliques), but none of them produced a substantively meaningful partition of the network. 
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allegiance as demonstrated in table 2 and in extant historical accounts. In addition, since information 
on residence can be traced and cross-referenced through a number of sources including census 
reports, this information is available for 2,298 individuals in the credit network data set. The resulting 
residence partition of the credit network provides the basis for the two network variables of cross-
factional brokerage and coordination within factional clusters.13 In all the analyses that follow, 
regional clusters therefore represent factional clusters and are the basis for distinguishing relations 
within factional subgroups and relations between them. 
 Returning to the bivariate results in table 2, I find a significantly higher involvement in credit 
activities for pro-Vermonters than for pro-Yorkers. Pro-Vermonters in this sample had an average 
number of about six debtors and an average number of about 3.7 creditors. Yorkers had an average 
of only 2.4 debtors, and were tied to an average of about 2.7 creditors.14 Similarly, pro-Vermonters 
included a significantly higher proportion of local coordinators (.24) than Yorkers (.11). The 
proportion of cross-factional (cross-regional) brokers is not significantly different for pro-
Vermonters (.12) and pro-Yorkers (.10).15 Thus, the main conclusion of these results is that both 
religious affiliation and residential patterns were strongly and positively correlated with factional 
alignment. The bivariate comparisons based on this sample confirm previous historical 
interpretations. Supporters of Vermont independence were predominantly adherents of New Light 
and Separate persuasions and residents of the western half of the state. Defenders of New York 
authority were mostly affiliated with Old Light or Anglican persuasions and resided in the Southeast. 
Additionally, I find some evidence for higher credit network activity among pro-Vermonters than 
among pro-Yorkers. In the following section, I shall analyze credit network dynamics between the 
regionally based factions directly. 
Credit Network Dynamics 
                                                     
I focus first on changes in the global structure of credit ties that were sent and received within and 
between regions over time. The results provide a first cut into the pattern of credit exchanges. This is 
followed by an analysis of individual level positions within the network structure. For this purpose, I 
split the credit network into three separate period-specific networks based on the dates of ties. The 
periodization is based on substantive historical grounds. 
 The first period encompasses the years 1768-1784, the period of fierce factional conflict 
between pro-Vermonters and Yorkers, and the struggle for the independence of Vermont. It also 
marks the time of the Revolutionary War of the American colonies against Great Britain, in which 
most Vermonters actively participated (Fisher and Fisher 1992). For instance, in May 1775, Ethan 
Allen and the Green Mountain Boys seized British Fort Ticonderoga in a dubious attack, and later 
on, the Green Mountain Boys were even formed into a battalion of the Continental Army. Support 
for the American effort outside of Vermont, however, did not keep settlers from internal conflicts. 
13 The distribution of brokers and coordinators by region and political affiliation confirms that residence and 
factional alliance are strongly correlated: 21 out of 23 pro-Vermont brokers resided in the two western regions, 
and 8 out of 9 pro-New York brokers resided in the Southeast. Likewise, 46 out of 47 pro-Vermont 
coordinators resided in the Southwest, and 9 out of 10 pro-New York coordinators resided in the Southeast. 
14 The relatively large estimate for pro-Vermonters on indegree (5.93) is due to one outlier, Samuel Billings who 
had 963 debtors listed in his probate account. Excluding Billings’ score from the estimation yields a weighted 
mean for this subgroup of 3.31 ties (s.e.=.33), and a slightly decreased outdegree of 3.39 ties (s.e.=.24). The 
difference between pro-Vermonters and Yorkers remains statistically significant (p=.018). It is important to 
note, however, that Billings’ contribution is not as consequential as it may seem. His position is largely 
connecting structural isolates in the credit network that are not integrated into any regional cluster. 
15 Alternatively, one may assess direct (i.e. unmediated) linkages between residents of two different regions and 
among residents within the same regional cluster. This measure is less precise compared to positions of 
mediation and potentially trivial in a structural sense because it does not control for the possibility that one 
measures merely dyadic ties between nodes that are otherwise isolated in their own region/faction. By contrast, 
brokerage and coordination are triadic measures. I nevertheless tested for the presence of direct ties and found 
no significant differences in their allocation between the two political factions. 
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Due to the intensity of struggles between Vermonters and Yorkers in this period, segregation among 
regional factions is expected to be high with few cross-regional ties sent between them. 
 A major objective of this article is to explore the differential influence of cross-factional 
social ties on the horizontal integration of localized factions within emergent states. The test case for 
integration then is the time when the emergent state of Vermont, according to leading historical 
interpretations, began to consolidate. The second period from 1785 to 1790 refers to this 
consolidation of the new state of Vermont until its admission to the Union as the fourteenth state. 
The year 1784 brought the old factional conflict between Vermonters and Yorkers within Vermont 
to an end, at least in military terms, and secured Vermont's independence from New York (Smith 
1981: 13-14). The treaty of Paris in 1783 also sealed an era of Vermont's foreign policy, including the 
secretive Haldimand negotiations between the British governor in Quebec and the western 
Chittenden-Allen faction who veered to either loyalism or support of the Revolution (Williams 1949: 
90-126). Disputes between political opponents in Vermont remained prevalent throughout the 1780s, 
but they began to be organized around different issues than separatism and independence. Of main 
concern were solutions to the widespread debtor grievances and to the compensation of Tories and 
Yorkers whose properties were confiscated during the war. In addition, local political conflicts 
gradually began to be couched in terms of more national debates (Austin 1974; Onuf 1983). 
 The third period, 1791-1800, includes roughly the first decade of Vermont as a member of 
the Union and accounts for a further shift in the significance of Vermont politics away from strictly 
local concerns toward a greater involvement into the national debate between Federalists and 
Republicans. This does not mean that local politics disappeared – in fact, they just found a different 
outlet in the party division of national politics between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian 
Republicans (Austin 1974; Shalhope 1996). The year 1800 also marks the “Revolution of 1800” when 
the Jeffersonian Republicans for the first time gained a sizeable majority in Congress (Elkins and 
McKitrick 1993). 
 The overall expectation then is the following. If horizontal integration of opposing regional 
factions with respect to credit relations was successful then a gradual increase in the density of cross-
regional ties and a corresponding decrease in the exclusive distribution of ties within regions should 
be observed. If, on the other hand, localism and factional division were sustained over time, ties 
should be concentrated within regional clusters with few relationships passing between regions. 
 Table 3 reports coefficients for the extent of credit ties sent within and across regions over 
the three time periods described above. Reading down the first column identifies the residence of the 
debtors in credit relationships in each time period. The header row lists the region of the creditors to 
whom the ties were sent. Coefficients are reported for the four main regions within Vermont, 
Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, and Northeast.16 The coefficients reflect departures from chance 
levels and are calculated as the difference between the observed and expected number of ties (as 
determined by the row and column marginals). The differences are further divided by the standard 
deviation of observed ties within each period to obtain lower and upper bounds.17 Hence, the values 
range between -1 and +1. A value of zero implies that the number of ties sent equals chance 
expectations. Positive values imply that more ties are sent than expected under random mixing. 
Negative values mean that fewer ties are sent than expected. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The major finding in table 3 is the persistence of local cohesion within regions. Consider first the 
patterns of credit exchanges between the Southwest and the Southeast since these two regions have 
been identified as the focal points of localist factions. These patterns are found in the upper left 
corner of each sub-panel in the table. Over the three periods, the number of credit relationships 
within the Southwest and within the Southeast was consistently higher than the number of ties 
                                                     
16 Other residential categories are excluded due to small numbers of observed ties or lack of substantive 
meaning (e.g. when residence is unknown). 
17 Formally, for a given cell entry in table 3, I define the coefficient of difference (D) for the number of ties (x) 
for region (A) in period (t) as Dt(A)=(xt - E(xt))/σt . 
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expected. Within the Southeast, coefficients remain at about the same high level, ranging between .52 
and .58. In the Southwest, preference for borrowing money within the region even doubled over 
time, from a value of .23 in the first period to a value of .47 in the third period. 
 Likewise, the number of credit ties sent and received between the two regions was 
significantly less than expected at chance levels. Coefficients for ties between southeastern debtors 
and southwestern creditors remain significantly negative at a value of -.58 in the first two periods and 
are still significantly negative at a value of -.48 in the third period. This is mirrored by the preference 
of southwestern debtors. Their refusal to borrow from southeastern creditors even increased 
significantly from a value of -.37 in the first period to a value of -.53 in the third period. These results 
demonstrate sustained or even increased local cohesion within the two politically most important 
regions, and increasing segregation of credit ties between them. Note also that this consistently crisp 
pattern is observed despite the fact that the overall number of ties sent and received rose significantly 
as well over time. For instance, the total number of ties received by southeastern creditors in the 
third period was more than six times as large as in the first period. Despite this striking increase, the 
direction of ties did not diversify as one would expect. Instead, local cohesion and cross-regional 
segregation persisted. 
 Turning to the other two regions, the apparent lack of internal cohesion within the two 
northern regions is mostly due to small numbers of observations. This makes the interpretation of 
coefficients for the ties sent within and between the two northern regions less meaningful. 
Comparisons of cross-regional tie distributions to the southern regions are more meaningful and can 
be summarized quickly. Southwestern debtors borrowing outside their own locality clearly preferred 
creditors from the Northwest. Northwestern debtors were also strongly embedded in relations with 
southwestern creditors. The number of cases is too small for the origin and destination of 
northeastern ties to be meaningfully interpreted. 
 Another way of interpreting these findings is to say that at the horizontal level of credit 
exchanges, revolutionary Vermont was divided into two main regional clusters, the Southeast versus 
the two western regions (and possibly also the Northeast). In contrast to what may be expected given 
the rise of federal politics and Vermont's gradual integration into the national arena, segregation 
between the two politically most influential regions − the Southwest around Bennington and 
southeastern Windham county − increased rather than decreased over time – at least as far as the 
structure of credit exchanges was concerned. This tendency towards intensifying localism was further 
supported by a consistently high degree of local cohesion within the Southwest and the Southeast.18 
 These observations are matched by corresponding shifts of individual level positions of 
brokerage and coordination within the credit network. Both positions allowed occupants to mediate 
between and within groups on the basis of their personal credit relationships. To assess the influence 
of these mediating positions within the credit network on factional politics and localism, I focus on 
their link to patterns of office holding over time. 
 After Vermont’s independence in 1777, statehood became a tangible reality, for its 
supporters and opponents alike. A new state also meant the creation and distribution of a range of 
new political and military offices. Factions continued to dominate political life but their 
confrontations found a new arena in the legislative assembly of town selectmen. Consequently, 
                                                     
18 Below I show how intensified localism was related to political processes. However, the overall growth in 
credit exchanges over time can be attributed in part to increased migration into Vermont (see note 6). Bellesiles 
(1993: 280-83) estimates a 397.6 percentage increase in Vermont's population between 1775 and 1791. The 
rising population density within each region might have provided enough opportunities for internal exchange, 
and reduced the need for ties to outsiders and the resulting transaction costs. Moreover, the pattern of in-
migration displayed segregation even before settlers reached the Grants. Pro-Vermonters and especially those 
who became Green Mountain Boys migrated predominantly from eastern Connecticut towns and other centers 
of New Light and Separatist religious dissidence through New York's eastern manor lands and into western 
Vermont. Pro-Yorkers, instead, migrated from the oldest Massachusetts frontier towns and centers of Old 
Light church establishment through northern Worcester Co. (Mass.) and southwestern New Hampshire into 
the southeastern Connecticut Valley of Vermont (Smith 1981; 1996). 
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holding public office became the new yardstick for political alignments. In marked contrast to New 
York, Vermont's constitution strengthened the role of the legislative assembly against the executive 
branch. The constitution thus granted supremacy to local interests over a central state government, 
and attested to the distrust of central authority and the weight of localism in Vermont and elsewhere 
across New England (Lemon 1984: 100). The all important town representatives to the state 
assembly were elected by the freemen in every town (two representatives for towns over eighty 
persons, and one for towns with less than eighty persons). The assembly held the power of 
legislation, finances, appointment and impeachment, and thus controlled the governor and his 
council who were also elected by the freemen in the state. In addition, every seven years the freemen 
elected the Council of Censors, which acted as guardian of the constitution (Williamson 1949: 63-64; 
Comstock 1918). 
 The two network mediation variables, brokerage and coordination, are used to assess the 
influence of individual bridging positions on the dynamics of office attainment in the emergent state. 
The underlying rationale is the following. Under conditions of a general trend towards integration 
between regions, individuals who built bridges across strongly localized and politically segregated 
factions acted as agents of integration. In this situation, brokers were likely to be rewarded with 
influential positions such as political offices in the new state. Unlike brokers, coordinators as 
promoters of local cohesion should have had a lower rate of office attainment. Reversely, if credit 
relations served mainly as badges of strong local identity, brokerage was likely to be negatively related 
to office holding. In this scenario, local cohesion and adherence to local factional identity was valued 
higher than statewide integration, and coordinators were more likely to be elected to represent the 
interests of their groups than cross-factional brokers. 
[Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here] 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the overall salience of credit networks for obtaining offices in early 
Vermont. Table 4.1 compares the average number of debtors and creditors for those individuals in 
the sample who held offices and for those who did not. Naturally, the total number of officers was 
much smaller than those who did not obtain an office. Yet, officers were linked on average to more 
than twice as many debtors and creditors than those without offices, a highly significant difference 
(p=.000). This is complemented by the results in table 4.2, which compares the proportion of 
officers across network positions. There are two important results in this table. The first finding is 
that the proportion of officers was consistently higher within the categories of brokers and 
coordinators compared to those who did not occupy these mediating network positions. The second 
major result is that coordinators who forged localism were better positioned to obtain offices than 
brokers who bridged across regions. It is theoretically possible and empirically plausible that 
influential individuals occupy positions of brokerage and local coordination at the same time. That is, 
the proportion of officers was significantly higher (.20) among brokers in the credit network who 
simultaneously acted as coordinators in their local community than for those who were merely 
brokers (.08).  However, local coordinators did not gain a significant advantage by also occupying 
positions of brokerage. Compared to mere coordinators, the proportion of office holders among 
coordinators who were also brokers is not significantly larger (p=.294).  
 Similar findings are obtained in a multivariate context. Table 5 reports logistic regression 
results for the likelihood of holding a Vermont office conditional on the four network properties and 
selected covariates. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The results in table 5 confirm that an increasing involvement in the credit network is significantly 
related to office attainment. Borrowing from creditors appears to be positively related to office 
holding while lending to debtors seems to reduce the chances of being elected, yet the magnitudes of 
these links are very small indeed. Local coordination is strongly and positively related to office 
holding. Occupying positions of cross-regional brokerage, on the other hand, seems to have reduced 
a person's prospect for office. This apparent disadvantage is largely the result of a gradual decline of 
the salience of brokerage over time as will become evident shortly. 
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 The more general finding then is that embeddedness into the credit network, and especially 
positions of brokerage and local coordination did matter for obtaining offices. The higher credit tie 
volume for officers in table 4.1 also suggests that in early Vermont economic elites and political elites 
were by and large congruent, a link that has also been observed in other parts of the United States 
during the Federalist period (e.g. Gould 1996). 
[Table 6 about here] 
There are a total of 143 officers included in the present network sample. Table 6 reports relevant 
summary statistics for these Vermont officers. The first public offices were filled in 1777, but I 
included town delegates to the first conventions in 1776 that paved the road to statehood a year later 
(Comstock 1918). Persons could be elected to federal offices beginning in 1791 when Vermont had 
joined the Union. The total number of offices held ranges between one and sixteen, including 
concurrent positions and reelections. The average total number of positions is about 3.5 offices 
(median=2). Seventy-two percent of incumbents were reelected. Office careers could be very long 
(up to 41 years), but the average career lasted about nine and a half years. Overlap of concurrent 
offices was considerable with some persons holding up to twelve offices at the same time 
(mean=1.93). Yet, 90 percent of all 143 officers attained no more than seven positions total. To get a 
sense of the temporal distribution of offices, consider the array of subsequent positions for each 
person over time. The last office in the data was left in 1850, but the majority of positions were filled 
and left by 1801, the first year of Jefferson’s presidency. Thus, 89 percent of all first positions, 88 
percent of all second positions, and 83 percent of all third positions were filled by 1801. Even for 
those who attained up to seven offices, 67 percent of seventh positions were filled by that year. 
Likewise, 89 percent of first positions, 80 percent of second positions, and 79 percent of all third 
positions were vacated by 1801. Finally, considering the distinct categories of offices by 
administrative level, local level offices (mainly town representatives) were on average obtained more 
than twice as often as positions at any other level. Similarly, the average proportion of local level 
offices among all positions (.62) is more than three times as high as the next highest proportion (.20 
for county offices). In addition, the proportion of New Light and Separatist Calvinists was slightly 
higher (.63) than the proportion of Old Lights. The largest numbers of officers came from the 
Southwest (45 percent) and the Southeast (31 percent), which again confirms the political importance 
of the two southern counties in the state. Thirteen percent of officers occupied brokerage positions 
in the credit network, and 26 percent occupied local coordinator positions. 
 Consider now the coupling of network position and different levels of office holding over 
time. Table 7 describes temporal changes in the proportion of office levels for brokers, local 
coordinators, and those coordinators who did not simultaneously occupy brokerage positions.19 I 
distinguish the same three historical time periods as before, with one exception. The first period 
begins later, in 1776, the year when New Hampshire Grants settlers first elected delegates to 
represent their towns at the early conventions to debate the prospects of an independent state 
(Comstock 1918). As well, I restricted the analysis to offices that were held no later than 1800.  
[Table 7 about here] 
The coefficients in each period reflect the proportion within a given administrative level by network 
position. For instance, 70 percent among the 37 coordinators who ever held an office were elected to 
at least one office in the first period, 1776-1784. Likewise, out of all brokers who were officers at 
some point, 72 percent were elected to a local office in the same period. The last two columns in 
table 7 report odds ratios for shifts in the influence of network position on office attainment across 
the three periods. Compared are the odds of being elected to a given office level across two 
successive time periods by structural position. For example, for coordinators, the odds of being 
elected to county offices increased by 19 percent (OR=1.19) in the third period as compared to the 
second period (P3 vs. P2). Changes for federal offices cannot be assessed since these positions were 
filled only in the last of the three periods. 
                                                     
19 The already small number of brokers who held offices in the sample does not allow breaking the category 
further down into those who were just brokers, and those who were also coordinators. 
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 The central finding that emerges from this analysis is that over time local coordinators were 
much more likely than cross-regional brokers to be elected to offices. This pattern is even more 
pronounced for those who occupied coordinator positions without being a broker as well. Thus, 
from the first to the second period (P2 vs. P1), the proportion of offices held dropped across office 
levels and for all three network positions. However, except for brokers holding county offices, this 
decrease in the likelihood of office attainment is much stronger for brokers than for the two 
coordinator positions. For brokers of credit ties across regions, the odds of office attainment 
dropped by 92 percent between the second and the first period. For coordinators in general, by 
contrast, the odds decreased only by 70 percent, and for coordinators who were not brokers, the 
odds of being elected decreased by only 57 percent across the same periods. This stark difference 
between brokers and coordinators is repeated in the shifts from the second to the third period (P3 
vs. P2). Here, both categories of coordinators gained significantly across all levels of offices, while 
brokers remained at the same low proportions of office holding as in the previous period except for 
gaining two federal offices in 1791. 
 The most striking result, given the all important role of town representatives in the legislative 
assembly, is that coordinators compared to brokers were able to obtain so significantly higher 
proportions of local offices − which are essentially town representatives − between the second and 
the third period. For coordinators in general, the odds of being elected to local offices increased by 
100 percent in the third period as compared to the second period. The odds increased even more for 
those coordinators who did not occupy brokerage positions (OR=2.79), whereas brokers held the 
same proportion of local offices (.17) as in the second period (OR=1.00).20 
 To summarize, at the horizontal level of credit exchanges across regions I find evidence for a 
strong tendency towards sustained or even increasing localism within the two politically most 
important regions, the Southwest and the Southeast. The two regions were also shown to represent 
opposing factional identities expressed in religious affiliation and political alignment. This factional 
cleavage was matched by a tendency towards increasing segregation of credit ties between the two 
regions. There is also a corresponding finding at the level of individual network positions. 
Coordinators, individuals whose structural position in the credit network allowed them to forge local 
cohesion within regions, were shown to have gained significant influence through the attainment of 
important offices. For brokers, there was apparently only a narrow window of opportunity for 
building bridges across increasingly segregated regions and factions. This window opened only in the 
period from 1776 to 1784 when brokers held a sizeable proportion of political offices. 
Later Factions: Federal Politics and Localism 
                                                     
In the mid 1780s, the focus of Vermont's domestic politics shifted towards the issues of increasing 
debtor grievances caused by the scarcity of money supply, and whether Tories and Yorkers whose 
estates had been confiscated and sold during the Revolutionary War should be compensated. 
Governor Chittenden and his old political allies, including the Allens, showed much sympathy for the 
plight of debtors and those settlers who had bought the estates of Loyalists during the War and 
improved the lands. The interests of creditors and former Loyalists were represented by a new class 
of educated lawyers who had moved to Vermont during the War or shortly afterwards. The two most 
prominent of these new gentlemen were Nathaniel Chipman and Isaac Tichenor. These newcomers 
were not involved in the experience of the separatist movement and the conflicts between New 
Hampshire Grants settlers and pro-Yorkers. People like Chipman and Tichenor came to Vermont in 
search for opportunities to advance their careers and social standing (Austin 1974; Shalhope 1994). 
20 A competing argument rests on the vacancy chain property of office attainment: positions had to be vacated 
by incumbents before others could step in (White 1970). Hence, differences in attainment are observed because 
some positions were "blocked" by incumbents across periods. Office holding certainly followed a vacancy 
model, but the argument about a continuous "blocking" over time hardly applies to the annually elected local 
offices of town representatives. Even offices that were filled for more than a year show increases over time (at 
least for coordinators). Yet another argument posits that proportions increased in the last period because more 
townships meant more seats in the assembly to be filled. This argument, however, does not explain why only 
coordinators increased their share of offices. The results suggest political reasons instead. 
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 Especially Chipman emerged as the major opponent of the Chittenden-Allen faction by 
forging a coalition of former Yorkers, merchants, lawyers, conservatives like Jacob Bayley, and those 
supporters of independent Vermont who resented the political influence of the Allens. To break the 
dominance of the Chittenden-Allen faction, Chipman exposed their secret negotiations with the 
British Governor of Quebec, General Haldimand, during the Revolutionary War about the possibility 
of Vermont's return into the Empire. Chipman and federal leaders like Alexander Hamilton and 
George Washington clearly perceived that the Allens' interest in the state of Vermont was dictated by 
their desire to secure their New Hampshire land grants in the northwestern Champlain Valley and 
their economic investments in the trade with Canada (Jones 1939; Williamson 1949).21 Aided by 
another scandal over undeclared land grant transactions involving again Chittenden and Ira Allen, 
Chipman and his faction succeeded in 1789 to temporarily oust the Chittenden-Allen faction from 
the government of the state. This political change resulted in the settling of the conflict with New 
York in 1790, and finally the admission of Vermont to the United States in 1791. As a consequence 
of these changes, Vermont's domestic politics became increasingly framed in terms of political 
conflicts at the national level. Members of the Chipman-Tichenor faction became leading Federalists 
within Vermont, while the members of the Chittenden-Allen faction tended to support the emerging 
party of Jeffersonian Republicans. 
 The critical observation here is that the shift of Vermont politics into the national arena of 
disputes between Federalists and Jeffersonians coincided with the strengthening of localist factions 
within Vermont that has been demonstrated in the previous section. The results in table 8 illustrate 
the extent to which the conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonians corresponded to the 
dimensions of factional politics within Vermont. 
[Table 8 about here] 
The first major difference concerns former partisanship in support of Vermont or New York. All 
twenty-one Jeffersonians in this sample had also been supporters of Vermont's independence from 
New York. Their political preference is also reflected in their pattern of office holding. Not a single 
one of them ever held a public or military office under New York authority in the territory of 
Vermont. Yet, nineteen out of these twenty-one Jeffersonians were elected or appointed to offices 
under Vermont jurisdiction. Likewise, eighteen of them resided in the western part of the state, with 
76 percent coming from the Southwest. Indeed, the "Jeffersonian Republican Party in Vermont 
obtained its greatest support in the Southwest and the Champlain Valley", appealing "primarily to the 
small farmers" in these regions (Williamson 1949: 258). The previous sections have shown that pro-
Vermonters also came predominantly from the Southwest and Northwest of the state. As well, the 
majority among these western pro-Vermonters (66 percent, see table 2) adhered to the New Light 
and Separatist persuasions. Again, a similar or even clearer tendency can be found among 
Jeffersonians: seventeen out of twenty were New Lights or Separatist Calvinists. In other words, 
members of the Jeffersonian Republican party at the level of national politics found an almost exact 
counterpart in the factional divisions at the level of domestic politics within Vermont. 
 Republicans in Vermont were "loyal followers of Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine, inspired 
by the French Revolution" (Roth 1987: 68). They strove to continue the radical democratic heritage 
of Vermont's independence movement in favor of popular government and the egalitarian fervor of 
New Light and Separate Church doctrines. As defenders of Vermont's republican past they 
embodied Jefferson's ideal of the uncorrupted morality of a "Yeomen Republic" (Elkins and 
McKitrick 1993). All they could discern in the elitist federal policies of Hamilton was a return to the 
aristocracy of the Tories. Thus, Matthew Lyon, a former indentured Irish servant and main opponent 
                                                     
21 Alexander Hamilton expressed the concern about Vermont's political loyalties in his speech to the New York 
assembly in March 1787: “Vermont is in fact independent, but she is not confederated. And I am constrained to add, 
that the means which they employ to secure that independence, are objects of the utmost alarm to the safety of 
this state, & to the confederation at large. […] I say, is it not probable, under such circumstances, they will 
provide for their own safety, by seeking connections elsewhere? And who that hears me, doubts, but that these 
connections have already been formed with the British in Canada” (Walton 1875, vol. III., p.423). 
 16
of Chipman within Vermont, declared when "the struggles commenced between aristocrats and 
democrats, nature, reflection and patriotism led me to take the Democratic side" (cited in Elkins and 
McKitrick 1993: 709). 
 Leading Federalists in Vermont resented this populist impulse against the standing order and 
the lack of respect for authority, unity, and morality. The Republicans' support for the egalitarian 
ideals of the French Revolution and the emergence of Democratic Societies in Vermont led 
Nathaniel Chipman to deplore that the "Gallic Mania still rages" (cited in Williamson 1949: 265). 
Unlike Jeffersonian Republicanism, the more conservative ideals of the Federalists matched the 
traditional and hierarchical worldview of former Old Light and Anglican defenders of New York 
authority in southeastern Windham County, "encompassing social stratification, deference to natural 
social leaders, consensual communal homogeneity, and a deeply ingrained obsession with social 
harmony and order" (Smith 1996: 202; see Roth 1987: 68-79). Hence, as the results in table 8 show, 
in marked contrast to the undivided support of Jeffersonians for Vermont independence, nine out of 
eighteen Federalists in this sample advocated New York's authority on the Grants. While most of 
these Federalists held Vermont offices like the Republicans, at least seventeen percent of twenty-
eight Federalists also held New York offices. The pattern becomes even crisper with respect to 
religious affiliation. Twenty out of twenty-three leading Federalists were Old Light Calvinists or 
Anglicans, compared to a small minority of three New Lights and Separates among them. While 
Jeffersonians came predominantly from the West, Federalists in this sample were more diverse and 
resided both in the western and the eastern half of the state. Other sources, however, indicate that 
the support for Jeffersonians in the West was compensated by much stronger support for the 
Federalist Party in the eastern Connecticut Valley than the present results suggest (Williamson 1949: 
260). For instance, Smith (1981: 886) finds strong evidence for the concentration of Federalists in 
southeastern Windham County, where fifteen out of sixteen Federalists were affiliated with Old 
Lights or Anglicans, and sixty-three percent of them sided with the pro-Yorker faction. 
 The general conclusion then is that the national battles between Jeffersonian Republicans 
and Hamiltonian Federalists fell on an already fertile ideological ground within Vermont. The 
division between the two national level factions corresponded closely to the main factional cleavages 
that were in place in Vermont since the Revolution and the state's struggle for independence: 
"Federalist and Republican ideologues…charged all political debate with memories of past battles" 
(Roth 1987:72). The pattern is rather unambiguous. At both the national and the local level political 
conflicts were expressed along equivalent contrasts: popular rule, egalitarianism, revolution, and 
progression on the one hand, the rule of able leaders, elitism, hierarchy, tradition and communal 
order on the other hand. In other words, leaders of localist factions within Vermont did not have to 
adopt new national ideologies to serve their local interests. Instead, the shift of domestic horizontal 
conflicts into the national arena served to reinforce factional identities within Vermont and the move 
towards stronger localism revealed above. Accordingly, as the distribution of network positions in 
table 8 shows, the proportion of local coordinators in both political parties is at least twice as high as 
the proportion of brokers that crosscut divisions. Thus, relying on a firm social structural foundation 
for strong localism, factional politics in Vermont were cast in a similar oppositional rhetoric as those 
on the national level. 
CONCLUSION 
Studies of modern state building have tended to focus on the vertical relation between national state 
builders and defenders of localism. In the majority of historical cases, localism is shown to fall victim 
to state formation and political centralization. Here, I have drawn on one historical example, 
revolutionary Vermont, to show that state making does not inevitably lead to the demise of localism, 
but that it may actually sustain and foster it. 
 During the late eighteenth-century, Vermont's domestic politics were characterized by 
intense conflicts between factions with strong local attachments. The new state was created through 
secession from New York. Unlike the thirteen original members of the Union, Vermont lacked a 
unifying political identity and community. In the absence of such a collective identity, Vermonters 
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reverted to their localist identities, which in turn translated into opposing factions concerning the 
politics of the new state. 
 The historical evidence reveals that factional cleavages were by and large congruent with 
localist identities. Localism in early Vermont rested on categorical homogeneity within factions, 
primarily with respect to religious affiliation, political worldviews, and migration histories. In 
addition, the sectional geography of the state, especially the Green Mountain chain, determined 
settlement patterns, and hence economic geography, both of which further consolidated the 
categorical differences. Thus, the organization of factional politics was patterned on ecological 
homogeneity as well. 
 Social networks provided the relational foundation for the categorical markers of localism 
and factional identities. In particular, I have shown how factional politics were grounded in networks 
of credit exchanges. Although the reason for their widespread usage − the shortage of money supply 
− was seemingly exogenous to political concerns, these structures of economic exchange operated as 
vehicles of factional interests. Two central findings emerge from the analysis of the link between 
credit networks and localist factions. 
 The first finding is that the regional distribution of credit ties exhibits a crisp pattern of 
increasing segregation between the two focal regions of the factional divide. At the same time, the 
structure of credit ties within these regions reveals an equally strong tendency towards cohesion. A 
parallel process is found at the level of individual network positions. Here, it can be shown that 
individuals who occupied network positions of brokerage across regions and factions were 
increasingly barred from influential political offices. In stark contrast, coordinators who brokered 
network ties within their own region/faction took control of these influential political offices. Thus, 
over time the structure of the credit network shifted significantly towards segregation and local 
cohesion. Another way to interpret this result is to say that the persistence of cleavages between 
localist factions was the unintended by-product of the pursuit of economic interest. 
 The second finding is that the structural change towards increasing localism coincided quite 
precisely with a vertical shift of Vermont's domestic politics into the political conflicts between 
Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists at the national level due to Vermont's admission to the 
United States. There were certainly avenues for cooptation of local elites by national elites as in 
similar historical circumstances (Gould 1996, 1998; Kettering 1988; Tilly 1976). In early Vermont, 
however, I found evidence for the coupling of local and national level identities and factions that 
operated through a process of escalation (Schwartz 1976). Whereas cooptation tends to pull local 
elites into the national arena, escalation in Vermont meant that both frames of identity, local and 
national factional alignments, were organized around equivalent pairs of binary categorical 
oppositions. The nontrivial consequence is that the evocation of national politics almost directly 
resonated with the lines of conflict on the local level. In other words, parallel to the structural 
consolidation of localism, the gradual integration of Vermont into the process of state building at the 
national level strengthened the categorical foundations of localist factions. 
 The relatively clear-cut structural pattern of factional alliances also suggests another reason 
for the success of localism over political centralization in the early Vermont republic. That structure 
consisted of nested pairs of binary oppositions (New York vs. Vermont, New Light vs. Old Light 
Calvinists, East vs. West, gentry vs. yeomen). The clear divisions and homogeneous alliances 
resulting from this structure did not permit state makers to pursue the strategic maneuvers as political 
brokers that have been observed in other historical contexts (Padgett and Ansell 1993). With respect 
to social networks, political brokers were unable to monopolize ties across factions to exert tight 
control as the only available bridge among otherwise disconnected actors. As well, to outsiders, 
Americans and British alike, Vermont's early stance on foreign policy oftentimes appeared rather 
ambiguous, the secretive Haldimand negotiations being only the most prominent example. Those 
embedded into Vermont's domestic politics, however, were also locked into a binary coded political 
system that left little room for sophisticated strategizing based on "multivocality", where "single 
actions can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously" (Padgett and Ansell 
1993: 1263). One had to support either Vermont or New York, but not both − and whoever favored 
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New York quickly found himself accused of being a Loyalist in opposition to the Revolution. The 
strength of localism left few political choices. 
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APPENDIX A: TIMING AND VALUES OF NETWORK TIES 
This appendix addresses some methodological issues arising from the temporal distribution and the 
values of credit network ties included in the sample. 
 Exact dates are available for 269 credit ties. Since the date of the commissioners’ report is 
available for all credit exchanges, I use the time lag between the date of ties and associated report 
date to impute the temporal distribution of undated credit relations. For dated credit ties, the mean 
time difference between credit exchanges and commissioners’ reports is three years, but for more 
than 80 percent of the ties, the time difference is no more than four years. Since the distribution is so 
skewed, I use the median of two years rather than the mean to distribute undated exchanges. Hence, 
all credit ties for which no exact date is available are dated back two years from the date of the 
commissioners’ or administrator’s report, whichever is earlier. This timing procedure is not arbitrary. 
For instance, Grant (1961: 67) found a similar time window for early Connecticut inventories. As 
well, this durational distribution is apparently not unique to eighteenth-century America. For 
example, Rosenthal (1994) shows that long-term credits notes were also rare in eighteenth-century 
Burgundy, and short-term notes tended to be outstanding for less than a year on average before 
being repaid. In addition, I found no evidence that inclusion of dates during the probate process is 
systematically biased. Dates for credit exchanges were listed for comparatively wealthy decedents as 
well as for insolvent estates. Likewise, the proportion of records that contain dates does not 
systematically change over time. Finally, idiosyncratic recordkeeping can be ruled out since the same 
judges, clerks and commissioners were responsible for records with dates and records without dates. 
 The results on credit ties reported in table 3 are calculated on the basis of this design. Unlike 
the global distribution of relationships displayed in that table, the issue of temporal change is a 
different one for individual level positions such as brokers and coordinators. Stated most simply, the 
issue is that the credit network ties are recorded in the probate files of dead people only. It follows 
that the information on credit ties is significantly sparser for those cases that are still alive, and 
especially for those I am most interested in, i.e. the politically active ones. For example, the first 
period in the analyses above (1776-1784) comprises a much sparser network than later periods. Many 
influential persons who were coded as brokers or coordinators across all time points would even be 
excluded if such network positions were defined as period-specific − not because they were less 
important in the first period, but simply because they had not died by that time. It is needless to say 
that every effort was made to determine if individuals who occupied important network positions 
were still alive in the period under study. However, the data limitation just described forces me to 
measure brokerage and coordinator positions as time-invariant variables. Temporal changes in 
relation to office holding are then interpreted in analogy to time-varying effects of covariates in a 
regression context, where the value of a covariate for individual observations remains the same 
throughout, but the estimated coefficient may change across periods. 
 Another issue concerns the values of network ties, i.e. the amounts of money involved in the 
credit exchanges. The analyses reported here are based on a dichotomous coding of network ties 
(presence versus absence of a relation between two individuals), which disregards their particular 
values (but retains the direction of ties in the adjacency matrix). The core meta-theoretical argument 
of this article is that the formation of collective identities is tied to shifts in the structural patterns of 
social networks. In this view, it is the pattern of a social network that matters, and not the particular 
values of the relationships that form the network. A simple test of the robustness of this argument is 
to compare the distribution of credit tie values across the three periods used in the analyses above. 
The results for a sample of 2,281 credit ties whose values are denoted in pounds and shilling 
demonstrate that the value distribution does not significantly change over time. Mean comparisons 
of the amount of money for period 1 (£8), period 2 (£7, 14s.), and period 3 (£9, 9s.) show no 
statistically significant differences. Likewise, the median amounts and interquartile ranges (iqr) of tie 
values for period 1 (median=£1, 15s.; iqr=£5, 10s.), period 2 (median=£1, 15s.; iqr=£5, 9s.), and 
period 3 (median=£1, 8s.; iqr=£3, 11s.) are essentially equivalent. The returns suggest that the 
averages are inflated by outliers. For comparison, in the probate records, “one pair of stockings” was 
evaluated at 5½s. in 1789, a doctor’s “visit and council” could range between 2s. and £2, 14s. in the 
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same year, and “one Yoke Oxen” could cost as much as £10, and “six Sheep” £2, 6s.in 1786. 
However, the central conclusion here is that the distribution of values on credit ties remains 
essentially the same across the three periods of concern, and thus does not affect the analyzed shifts 
in the structural pattern of ties. 
 
APPENDIX B: CODING OF VERMONT OFFICES 
 
Local offices:  Town representatives in the Vermont Assembly 
   Town delegates to early conventions, 1776-1777 
   Town representatives at Constitutional Conventions 
   Town clerks 
County offices:  Highway surveyor 
   Members of Committee of Safety 
   Judges of special courts, Clerk, Sheriff, Probate Judges in Bennington and  
   Cumberland Counties, 1778 
County Judges, Assistant Judges, County Clerk, Sheriff, Constable, State 
Attorneys, and Probate Judges after 1778 
State offices:  Governor, Lt. Governor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, Attorney General,  
   Auditors of Accounts, Justices of Vermont Supreme Court, 
Justices of Circuit Court, Superior Judges 
   Members of the Council of Safety (1778) 
   Members of the Council (1778 and later) 
   Secretaries to the Governor and Council 
   Speaker and Clerk of the House 
   Members of Council of Censors 
   Collectors (until 1791) 
Federal offices:  Senators in Congress 
   Representatives in Congress 
   Presidential electors 
   Judges of the U.S. District Court 
   District Attorneys 
   Marshalls 
   Clerks of the District Court 
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 Table 1.—Measurement of variables 
Variable  Description Data sources 
Early Faction =1 if member of pro-Vermont faction, =0 if member of pro-Yorker faction Fisher and Fisher (1992); 
Smith (1981; 1996) 
 
Religion =1 if Radical Calvinist (Separates, New Lights and related sects), =0 if Arminian (Old Light, Anglican and 
related persuasion) 
 
Smith (1981; 1996) 
 
Residence Set of dummy variables for Southwest Vermont (Bennington Co.), Northwest (Rutland, Addison, 
Chittenden Co.), Southeast (Windham Co.), Northeast (Windsor, Orange, Essex Co.), or outside of 
Vermont. 
=1 if resided in respective region, =0 otherwise 
 
Probate data; Comstock 
(1918); 1790 and 1800 
census; Fisher and Fisher 
(1992); Smith (1981; 1996) 
 
VT office =1 if any office held under Vermont authority, =0 otherwise 
For coding of administrative levels of Vermont office, see appendix B. 
 
Comstock (1918); Fisher 
and Fisher (1992) 
 
NY office =1 if any office under New York authority held in Vermont, =0 otherwise Smith (1981); Fisher and 
Fisher (1992) 
 
Later Faction Late political allegiance =1 if supporter of Jeffersonian Republican Party, =0 if supporter of Federalist 
Party. 























 Table 2.—Frequencies of Attributes by Early Political Faction (N=283) 
 Pro-VT Pro-Yorker Sig. diff. (p) 
Religion:    
New Light, Separatist* 129 (.66) 1 (.01) .000 
Old Light, Anglican 21 (.11) 69 (.78) .000 
Religion unknown 44 (.23) 19 (.21) .802 
    
Residence:    
Southwest 122 (.63) 5 (.06) .000 
Southeast 22 (.11) 71 (.81) .000 
Northwest* 29 (.15) 1 (.01) .000 
Northeast 16 (.08) 9 (.10) .608 
Other region 5 (.03) 2 (.02) .868 
    
Office holding:    
VT office 88 (.45) 33 (.37) .191 
NY office 5 (.03) 35 (.39) .000 
    
Credit Network:  
Indegree: mean number of debtors** 5.93 (1.15) 2.42 (.17) .003 
Outdegree: mean number of creditors** 3.73 (.28) 2.70 (.17) .002 
Coordinator 47 (.24) 10 (.11) .011 
Broker 23 (.12) 9 (.10) .667 
N in faction 194    89  
Note: Proportion within faction in parentheses. 
* One cell count smaller than 5. 
** Weighted sample means, standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Table 3.— Credit Ties Sent Within and Across Vermont Regions, 1768-1800 
(departures from chance expectations) 
 Creditors’ residence 
Debtors’ residence Southwest Southeast Northwest Northeast Total ties sent
Period 1, 1768-84:   
Southwest .23 -.37 .20 -.05 350
Southeast -.58 .53 -.05 .11 51
Northwest .31 -.14 -.12 -.05 82
Northeast .04 -.02 -.02 -.01 10
Total ties received 384 40 54 15 N=493
  
Period 2, 1785-90:  
Southwest .31 -.38 .08 -.01 569
Southeast -.58 .58 -.03 .04 182
Northwest .22 -.16 -.04 -.02 217
Northeast .06 -.04 -.02 -.01 83
Total ties received 854 147 35 15 N=1051
 
Period 3, 1791-1800:  
Southwest .47 -.53 .06 0 845
Southeast -.48 .52 -.04 0 233
Northwest .02 -.01 -.01 0 38
Northeast -.02 .02 -.01 0 27
Total ties received 792 250 77 24 N=1143
 
Note: Coefficients report departures from chance levels of credit exchanges as defined by row and column 
marginals. Difference (D) in the number of ties (x) for region A in period (t) is defined as Dt(A)=(xt - E(xt))/σt. 
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 Table 4.1.—Salience of credit tie volume for political office 
(means comparison, standard errors in parentheses) 
 Officeholders No office 
Indegree: number of debtors 2.85 (.26) 1.12 (.06) 
Outdegree: number of creditors 3.79 (.23) 1.07 (.02) 
   
N 143 3535 
Note: Estimates are weighted sample means. 









Table 4.2.—Salience of network position for political office 
(comparison of proportions) 
Compared positions N Prop. Officeholders Sig. diff. (p) 
Broker vs. 131 .14  
Non-Broker 3547 .04 .000 
   
Coordinator vs. 231 .16  
Non-Coordinator 3447 .03 .000 
   
Broker, not coordinator vs. 72 .08  
Broker and coordinator 59 .20 .047 
   
Coordinator, not broker vs. 172 .15  
Coordinator and broker 59 .20 .294 
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 Table 5.—Logistic Regression of Vermont Office holding 
(Weighted Pseudo-Likelihood Estimates) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  
Odds 
Ratio 
95% c.i. Odds 
Ratio
95% c.i. Odds 
Ratio
95% c.i. Odds 
Ratio
95% c.i. 
New Light **.49 .37.64 **.47 .36.61 **.50 .38.67 **.46 .35.60 
Pro-VT **3.21 2.404.29 **3.21 2.444.20 **3.06 2.274.11 **3.22 2.454.24
Southeast 1.10 .941.30 1.07 .911.25 1.17 .991.37 1.11 .941.30 
NY office 1.08 .931.26 1.02 .871.19 1.02 .881.19 .99 .851.17 
N debtors   **.98 .97.99  **.98 .97.99 
N creditors   **1.03 1.021.04  **1.03 1.021.05
Broker     *.71 .55.91 **.53 .39.71 
Coordinator     **2.01 1.612.51 **1.70 1.362.14
         
N 220 220 220 220 
F-test **19.70 **26.88 **19.36 **22.55 
Note: *p = .006    **p  .000 
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 Table 6.—Summary Statistics for Vermont Officeholders 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total positions 143 3.48 3.17 1 16 
Prop. Reelected 135 .72 .45 0 1 
Tenure 132 9.58 10.07 1 41 
Total office overlaps 142 1.93 2.99 0 12 
   
Total distinct positions:   
All offices 143 2.71 2.15 1 9 
Local offices 140 1.32 .91 0 4 
County offices 140 .64 .88 0 4 
State offices 140 .61 1.02 0 5 
Federal offices* 140 .18 .48 0 3 
Average prop. distinct positions:   
Local offices 140 .62 .40 0 1 
County offices 140 .20 .30 0 1 
State offices 140 .15 .25 0 1 
Federal offices* 140 .03 .09 0 .50 
   
Prop. New Light, Separatist 128 .63 .48 0 1 
Prop. Southwest 143 .45 .50 0 1 
Prop. Southeast 143 .31 .46 0 1 
Prop. Northwest 143 .14 .35 0 1 
Prop. Northeast 143 .10 .30 0 1 
Prop. Broker 143 .13 .33 0 1 
Prop. Coordinator 143 .26 .44 0 1 
Note: See Appendix B for coding of office holding levels. 
Differences in the number of observations are due to missing cases. 
* Federal offices became available after Vermont’s admission to the Union in 1791. 
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 Table 7.—Proportion of Vermont Officers by Structural Position, 1776-1800 






P2 vs. P1 
(odds ratio) 
P3 vs. P2 
(odds ratio) 
Brokers (N=18)      
All offices .83 .28 .33 .08 1.26 
Local offices .72 .17 .17 .08 1.00 
County offices .22 .22 .17 1.00 .71 
State offices .22 .17 .17 .71 1.00 
Federal offices*   .11   
      
Coordinators (N=37)      
All offices .70 .41 .49 .30 1.39 
Local offices .54 .14 .24 .17 2.00 
County offices .19 .14 .16 .70 1.19 
State offices .27 .24 .30 .86 1.34 
Federal offices*   .08   
      
Coordinators, not Brokers 
(N=25) 
     
All offices .68 .48 .56 .43 1.38 
Local offices .48 .12 .28 .15 2.79 
County offices .20 .12 .16 .56 1.36 
State offices .28 .24 .32 .82 1.47 
Federal offices*   .08   
Note: See Appendix B for coding of office holding levels. 
* Federal offices became available after Vermont’s admission to the Union in 1791. 
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 Table 8.—Frequencies of Attributes by Later Political Faction 
(Proportion within faction in parentheses) 
 Federalists Jeffersonians 
Early Faction Membership:   
Pro-Vermont 9 (.50) 17 (1.00)
Pro-New York 9 (.50) 0
   
Religion:   
New Light, Separatist 3 (.13) 17 (.85)
Old Light, Anglican 20 (.87) 3 (.15)
   
Residence:   
Southwest 9 (.31) 16 (.76)
Southeast 10 (.34) 2 (.10)
Northwest 6 (.21) 2 (.10)
Northeast 4 (.14) 1 (.04)
   
Office holding:   
VT office 23 (.79) 19 (.90)
NY office 5 (.17) 0
   
Credit Network: 
Coordinator 6 (.21) 10 (.48)
Broker 2 (.07) 5 (.24)
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